

# JUSTIN J. HONG

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## EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2025 (expected)  
Dissertation Title: *Three Essays in Development and Political Economics*  
Dissertation Committee: Raymond Fisman, Dilip Mookherjee, and Martin Fiszbein  
B.A., Economics, Xiamen University (WISE), China, 2019  
Visiting Student, University of California, Berkeley, 2018

## FIELDS OF INTEREST

Development, Political Economy, Labor Economics, Behavioral Economics

## JOB MARKET PAPER

“The Costs of Leader Biases: Evidence from Superstitious Chinese Mayors,” (with Yuheng Zhao)

## PUBLICATIONS

“Not Always a Panacea: History Education and Identity-Building in Taiwan,” (with Yuhan Lyu), *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* (2025), 229: 106837

## WORKING PAPERS

“Corruption and Human Capital Supply for the State,” 2023,  
Revise & Resubmit at *Journal of Labor Economics*.  
“Risk-Taking and Public Leadership: Evidence from Chinese Villages,” 2022,  
Revise & Resubmit at *Journal of Development Economics*.  
“Host Favoritism and Talent Selection in Chinese Science Olympiads,” (with Xuan Li), 2022,  
Revise & Resubmit at *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

“Southbound Bureaucrats and the Making of China, 1949 - 2019” (with Yuheng Zhao)  
“Licensed Corruption” (with Yiming Cao, Raymond Fisman, Xuan Li, and Michael Luca)  
“Robots and State Capacity” (with Yiming Cao)  
“Legal Capacity and State-Building”

## PRESENTATIONS

North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (joint with ASSA), 2025  
NBER – Development Economics Program Meeting, 2024  
CEPR Symposium – Development Economics, 2024  
Asian Meeting of the Econometrics Society, 2024  
Conference of the International Association for Applied Econometrics (IAAE), 2024  
Chinese Economists Society North America Annual Conference, 2024  
Hong Kong Economic Association Biennial Conference\*, 2023  
BU Wheelock PREREQ Seminar\*, 2023  
ASSA Annual Meeting (Poster), 2023

The Northeast Universities Development Consortium (NEUDC), 2022  
Development & Political Economics Graduate Conference, Stanford University, 2022  
Cambridge China Politics Research Workshop, MIT, 2021  
Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2019

(\*: coauthor presenting)

#### **FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS**

Rosenstein-Rodan Prize for Best Essay in Development Economics, Boston University, 2024  
Best Teaching Fellow Award, Boston University, 2022  
Dean's Student Fellowship, Boston University, 2019 - 2024  
National Scholarship, Ministry of Education (China), 2017

#### **WORK EXPERIENCE AND SUMMER SCHOOL**

Price Theory Summer Camp, University of Chicago, 2022  
Research Assistant for Raymond Fisman, Boston University, 2022 - 2023  
Research Assistant for Guo Xu, UC Berkeley, 2018  
Research Assistant for Xi Yang, Xiamen University, 2016

#### **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Teaching Fellow, Empirical Economics I (EC 203), Boston University, Spring 2023, Fall 2023, Spring 2024, Fall 2024  
Teaching Fellow, Empirical Economics II (EC 204), Boston University, Fall 2022  
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomics (EC 102), Boston University, Spring 2021  
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomics (EC 101), Boston University, Fall 2020, Fall 2021, Spring 2022, Summer 2022

#### **REFeree EXPERIENCE**

*Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of the European Economic Association, Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*

#### **DEPARTMENT SERVICE**

Development Reading Group, Boston University, Co-Organizer, Fall 2021 - Spring 2023  
MA-RA Mentor Program, Boston University, Mentor, Summer 2022 - Summer 2024

**LANGUAGES:** Chinese (native), Taiwanese Hokkien (fluent), English (fluent)

**COMPUTER SKILLS:** Stata, R, LaTeX, ArcGIS

**CITIZENSHIP:** China

#### **REFERENCES**

##### **Professor**

##### **Raymond Fisman**

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Boston University  
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##### **Professor**

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### **The Costs of Leader Biases: Evidence from Superstitious Chinese Mayors**

(Job Market Paper) *(with Yuheng Zhao)*

Subjective beliefs – many of which are non-factual or false – influence human decision-making, potentially including key individuals that wield considerable power. This paper documents for the first time the macro-level impact of leaders’ non-factual beliefs, exploiting prominent Chinese traditional beliefs that allow us to link quasi-random, leader-specific spatial biases to regional development within cities. We find that municipal zones perceived as unfavorable to mayors have an average 2 percent lower GDP compared to other zones. Exploiting mayoral reports and administrative micro-level data, we show reduced policy support and public investment as the key drivers. Downstream changes in firms and households further amplify the loss, with a 6% decrease in firm entry, a 4% reduction in the productivity of remaining firms, and a small population decline. Our back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests such non-factual beliefs of Chinese mayors are associated with at least a 0.1% annual GDP loss over the past two decades. Overall, our findings highlight subjective beliefs as an important determinant of leader performance that matters for economic development.

### **Corruption and Human Capital Supply for the State, R&R at *Journal of Labor Economics***

I study the impact of corruption crackdown on human capital supply for the state, exploiting China’s staggered anti-corruption inspections. Using unique applicant data from state organizations, I find that anti-corruption induces positive selection for prosociality into the state sector, without significantly affecting overall ability. These shifts in supply are associated with enhanced work performance. Changes in occupational preferences from a representative household panel corroborate talent allocation as a prominent mechanism. I further document dynamic effects wherein households increase investment in human capital and the integrity of the next generation. Together, these findings highlight reward structures as an important determinant of the public sector’s human capacity.

### **Risk-Taking and Public Leadership: Evidence from Chinese Villages,**

R&R at *Journal of Development Economics*

This paper studies the causal impact of risk-taking on public leadership, exploiting Chinese zodiac culture that creates within-individual variation in risk appetite. Employing a representative village panel, I find that lower risk-taking of village heads leads to improved governance processes and greater responsiveness. I also observe consistent expenditure changes, with higher public good spending and a comparable decline in administration spending that is prone to misuse. However, risk-averse leaders are also less likely to promote policy innovation. Collectively, risk avoidance can improve leader performance when incentives for responsiveness are limited, with a potential trade-off between accountability and public entrepreneurship.

### **Host Favoritism and Talent Selection in Chinese Science Olympiad *(with Xuan Li)*,**

R&R at *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization*

We study favoritism in the selection of elite scientific talent, by examining the host institution affiliation and performance in the Chinese Science Olympiad, where a gold medal guarantees a student’s admission to top universities. Using hand-collected participant-level data (2003 - 2021), we find that host-affiliated students have a significantly higher winning probability. We present evidence suggestive of cheating behavior using a portion of the contest vulnerable to information leakage, as well as the centralized post-Olympiad selection outside the control of host provinces. Together, our findings shed light on the crucial role of organizational structure in designing equitable assessment systems for talent.